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Human neuroscience has seen a recent boom in studies on reflective, controlled, explicit
social cognitive functions like imitation, perspective-taking, and empathy. The relationship
of these higher-level functions to lower-level, reflexive, automatic, implicit functions is
an area of current research. As the field continues to address this relationship, we
suggest that an evolutionary, comparative approach will be useful, even essential. There
is a large body of research on reflexive, automatic, implicit processes in animals. A
growing perspective sees social cognitive processes as phylogenically continuous, making
findings in other species relevant for understanding our own. One of these phylogenically
continuous processes appears to be self-other matching or simulation. Mice are more
sensitive to pain after watching other mice experience pain; geese experience heart rate
increases when seeing their mate in conflict; and infant macaques, chimpanzees, and
humans automatically mimic adult facial expressions. In this article, we review findings
in different species that illustrate how such reflexive processes are related to (“higher
order”) reflexive processes, such as cognitive empathy, theory of mind, and learning by
imitation. We do so in the context of self-other matching in three different domains—in
the motor domain (somatomotor movements), in the perceptual domain (eye movements
and cognition about visual perception), and in the autonomic/emotional domain. We
also review research on the developmental origin of these processes and their neural
bases across species. We highlight gaps in existing knowledge and point out some
questions for future research. We conclude that our understanding of the psychological
and neural mechanisms of self-other mapping and other functions in our own species can
be informed by considering the layered complexity these functions in other species.
Keywords: reflective processing, reflexive processing, social cognition, empathy, comparative cognition, evolution,
motor resonance
INTRODUCTION: HOW CAN AN EVOLUTIONARY
PERSPECTIVE INFORM HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE?
Students of evolutionary neuroscience may be familiar with the
metaphor of an old apartment building for brain evolution. At
first, the building is heated by a series of wood-burning fireplaces.
Later, a coal-fueled steam system is added in the chimneys and
hearths. Later still, an HVAC system is installed, with electrical
wiring grafted to the old hot water pipes. Every time something
goes wrong with the heat, someone has to determine whether
the problem is due to a wiring problem in the HVAC system,
damage to the old hot water pipes along which those wires run,
or a structural problem in the old chimneys that house the
whole apparatus. Like the addition of new heating systems to the
apartment building, evolution adds new functions to the brain by
building on the pre-existing architecture. Thus the old systems
don’t disappear: their new functions are integrated with their
pre-existing ones, and the continued function of the new systems
relies on the soundness of the old ones.
A prominent instantiation of this idea was MacLean’s triune
brain theory (MacLean, 1990), which posited that instinctual
behavior is controlled by the brain’s “reptilian complex” (basal
ganglia), basic social behavior by the “paleomammalian complex”
(limbic system), and higher cognitive function by the “neomam-
malian complex” (cerebral neocortex). Later anatomical work
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 224 | 1
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
Hecht et al. An evolutionary perspective on reflective and reflexive processing
showed this model to be overly simplistic, but the basic concept
of hierarchical processing is echoed by the recent proliferation
in dual process models in neuroscience and psychology. Current
models tend to make a two-way distinction. One type of system
is described as unconscious or preconscious, implicit, automatic,
low effort, rapid, perceptually driven, while another is described
as conscious, explicit, controlled, high effort, slow, and analytic
or reflective [reviewed in Evans (2008)]. For the sake of simplic-
ity, we will refer to the first sort of system as “reflexive” and the
second as “reflective,” although this two-way distinction is likely
also overly simplistic.
For some time, it was assumed that reflective social cognitive
processes were evolutionary “upgrades” unique to humans, or
perhaps humans and our closest living relatives, andmuch behav-
ioral research focused on identifying which skills are “uniquely
human” (Evans, 2008; de Waal and Ferrari, 2010). However,
there are reasons not to assume that humans’ most advanced
forms of social cognition lack correlates in other species. Like
the upgrades to the apartment heating system, human social cog-
nitive “upgrades” must achieve the same basic purpose as their
simpler predecessors—interacting with other individuals in the
environment in an adaptive way. Evolution modifies previously
existing forms to create new ones (for example, wings are mod-
ifications of limbs), and the new forms retain some features of
the old ones (bone structure). These adaptations must arise in
the context of a previously working social cognitive system, and
as such, must incorporate with it. New neural mechanisms must
function within the organism’s existing social cognitive frame-
work, or else the organism’s social behavior will be impaired and
its chances of survival will be reduced. Therefore, neural adapta-
tions for new social cognitive functions are likely to involve some
of the same neural architecture as preexisting systems.
Furthermore, functions that were once attributed only to
humans are increasingly being identified in other species. Thus,
reflective social cognition is probably uniquely developed in
humans, but not unique to us (Evans, 2008). It is important
to remember that all life on earth has been evolving for the
same amount of time and the phylogenic tree has no “top.”
Differences in function represent adaptation to different niches,
not higher or lower position in a scala naturae. A growing num-
ber of researchers in the field of comparative behavior stress
the explanatory utility of viewing most behavior as phylogeni-
cally continuous (de Waal and Ferrari, 2010), a position that was
espoused by Darwin (1872).
All of this argues that studying animals can tell us something
about human social cognition. Human neuroscience is currently
very interested in the brain’s “most modern upgrades”—reflective
processes like theory of mind, or thinking about what another
person is thinking (Premack and Woodruff, 1978), as well as
related processes like imitation, perspective-taking, and empathy.
Understanding these functions is relevant for understanding and
treating disorders of social cognition like autism in which they are
impaired. But like the heating in the old apartment building, these
functions aren’t stand-alone systems. Deficits in the higher level
functions may even be due to underlying, less obvious deficits in
the lower level functions. In such cases understanding the inter-
play between higher- and lower-level functions is essential for
understanding and treating deficits and disease affecting higher
level social functions.
In this review, we explore the interplay between higher- and
lower-level functions, as well as the question of what in particular
the study of animals can tell us about human social cognition.
We do so in the context of self-other matching, defined as any
phenomenon in which the observation of another’s behavior or
state causes the observer’s behavior or state to become congru-
ent with it. We have chosen this domain for several reasons. First,
the operational definition allows phenomena to be categorized by
easily observable output. In many species, comparable behavioral
data is available but data about underlying physiology or neu-
ral substrates is not (or it is available but contentious, as in the
question of whether human imitation involves or relies on the
mirror system). Grouping results by behavioral output allows for
cross-species comparisons without any a priori perspective about
underlying physiological processes. We will, however, draw con-
nections to underlying physiological and neural substrates when
possible. Second, self-other matching can occur in a reflexive
manner, but this reflexive processing can have measurable effects
on reflective processes. Third, self-other matching phenomena are
present in varying degrees of complexity across a wide range of
phyla. In this review, we limit our scope to vertebrates. We focus
heavily on primates, since they are most closely related to humans
and also the subject of a large body of comparative research, but
we also discuss some research in canids, rodents, birds, and rep-
tiles. In humans, self-other matching encompasses phenomena
like motor resonance, mimicry, imitation, emulation, empathy,
and perspective taking (defined in Table 1), which likely rely on
partially discrete and partially overlapping neural and psycholog-
ical mechanisms. Comparing which of these functions are present
in which other species can help us to structure our thinking about
the organization of these processes within our own species.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS: A COMPENDIUM OF SELF-OTHER
MATCHING PHENOMENA ACROSS SPECIES
SELF-OTHER MATCHING IN THE MOTOR DOMAIN:
SOMATOMOTOR MOVEMENTS
Somatomotor self-other matching can occur at a reflexive level via
motor resonance. Motor resonance is a general idea implicating
the activation of common neural or psychological substrates for
observed and executed action—e.g., observing another’s action
causes my motor system to “resonate” with theirs. When motor
resonance causes the overt output of an observed action, this
is termed “motor contagion”. A well-known example of motor
contagion occurs during infancy. For a brief period in devel-
opment, neonatal macaques, humans, and chimpanzees copy
observed orofacial movements (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977, 1983;
Heimann et al., 1989; Myowa-Yamakoshi et al., 2004; Ferrari
et al., 2006; Bard, 2007; Ferrari et al., 2009a,b; Paukner et al.,
2011). Human infants also copy observed finger movements
(Nagy et al., 2005). This effect disappears sometime around age
2 weeks in macaques, 2 months in chimpanzees, and 3 months in
humans (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977, 1983; Heimann et al., 1989;
Myowa-Yamakoshi et al., 2004; Ferrari et al., 2006). The fact that
this period lasts longer in humans may be relevant to species
differences in adult social cognition, although this idea awaits
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Table 1 | Terms and definitions.
General terms Mimicry In this review, used as a general, non-specific umbrella term for any kind of reflexive,
non-intentional, overt self-other matching
Copying In this review, used as a general, non-specific umbrella term to refer to any kind of
intentional, reflective, overt self-other matching
Motor domain Motor resonance Activation of common neural or psychological substrates for observed and executed
action—e.g., observing another’s action causes my motor system to “resonate” with
theirs
Motor contagion The overt, reflexive mimicry of an observed action via motor resonance
The “chameleon effect” Humans’ tendency to reflexively mimic others’ postures, mannerisms, facial
expressions, and behaviors, which plays a functional role in human social interactions
Motor interference A reduction in movement accuracy when observing a non-congruent movement,
caused by reflexive motor resonance
Social learning or
observational learning
Family of mechanisms by which an individual can copy an observed goal-directed
behavior
Emulation Copying an action’s goal or end result, but not its component movements or methods
Imitation Copying both an action’s end result and the component movements
Overimitation Copying component movements which do not contribute to reaching the action’s goal
Perceptual domain Gaze following A shift in eye gaze direction in order to match one’s own visual perception to another
individual’s
Following gaze geometrically Following another individual’s gaze behind a barrier; inferred to imply the ability for
perspective-taking
Perspective taking The understanding that another’s perceptual knowledge can differ from one’s own
(not always used to connote a reflective process)
Theory of mind The understanding that another’s representational mental states can differ from one’s
own (a type of perspective taking; generally connotes a reflective, controlled process)
Autonomic/emotional
domain
Contagion The reflexive instantiation of an observed emotional or autonomic state in one’s self
(non-referential)
Observational fear learning Acquiring a fear response to a particular stimulus based on observation of another
individual’s experience with that stimulus (referential)
Rapid facial reactions Brief, reflexive, low-intensity mimicry of observed facial expressions, measurable by
increased EMG activity in congruent facial muscles
Cognitive empathy A referential, reflective, explicit understanding of another individual’s emotional state
exploration. In adult humans, motor contagion in everyday social
interactions is sometimes called the “chameleon effect”—the
tendency to mimic others’ postures, mannerisms, facial expres-
sions, and behaviors. It increases liking, smoothes social interac-
tions, and is more common in empathic people (Chartrand and
Bargh, 1999). Orangutans spontaneously and rapidlymimic facial
expressions during play (Davila Ross et al., 2008), chimpanzees
experience contagion for aggressive and affliative social interac-
tions (Videan et al., 2005), and macaques are more likely to eat
when seeing or hearing another monkey eat (Ferrari et al., 2005).
In Paukner et al. (2011), human experimenters imitated capuchin
monkeys’ actions on a ball, such as poking or mouthing it. The
monkeys later preferred to spend more time in proximity to imi-
tator versus non-imitator humans, and also preferred to interact
with them in a task where tokens could be exchanged for food.
This suggests that motor contagion may play a role in their natu-
ralistic social interactions and may be important for establishing
affiliative relationships and prosocial behavior.
In addition to facilitating the production of actions congruent
to others’, motor resonance can interfere with the production
of non-congruent actions. This is termed “motor interference”
and is measured by a reduction in movement accuracy while
observing a non-congruent movement. In humans, motor
interference appears around age 4–5, is influenced by prior
knowledge or experience of the individual performing the
observed action, is weakened by self-focus, and is stronger when
the subject has practiced the observed action and when the
demonstrator is similar to the subject (Marshall et al., 2010; Saby
et al., 2011). Observing a sinusoidal arm movement interferes
with the observer’s own movement more if the observed move-
ment is directed toward a goal, suggesting that goal directed
actions are more contagious than non-goal-directed actions
(Bouquet et al., 2010). To our knowledge, motor interference
has not been studied in other species, although like motor res-
onance, it seems to be an easily addressable topic. For example, in
a paradigm used to study reach-to-grasp movements, macaque
monkeys grasp a bar in an apparatus that measures the force,
velocity, and direction of their arm movements [e.g., (Kalaska
et al., 1989)]. This could be used to measure perturbations
to a monkey’s movements while watching congruent versus
incongruent movements by another monkey.
In humans, evidence for a shared physiological basis
of action execution and observation at a low level comes
from electrophysiological experiments. Transcranial magnetic
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stimulation (TMS) to motor cortex can be used to produce
motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) in the periphery—e.g.,
stimulation to the thumb area of primary motor cortex evokes a
measurable electrophysiological effect in the thumb muscles. In
these TMS experiments, MEPs are greater during observation of
movements involving those muscles; this effect occurs for both
goal-directed and non-goal directed movements (Fadiga et al.,
1995; Maeda et al., 2002).
Furthermore, the timecourse of MEPs follows the time-
course of the observed action, showing that the human motor
system matches the individual, component movements of an
observed action (Gangitano et al., 2001). Additionally, electri-
cal stimulation to a nerve produces activation (twitching) in
monosynaptically-connected muscle fibers, called the H-reflex.
Baldissera et al. (2001) elicited H-reflexes from flexor finger
muscles while subjects viewed a hand either opening or clos-
ing. Activation of the flexor muscles was greater when subjects
observed a hand opening, which is the opposite of what occurs
during actual hand-opening execution (flexors close the hand)
and also opposite to the resonant excitability that occurs through
stimulation at the level of the cortex (i.e., the TMS experiments
above). This implies that motor resonance in the brain is some-
how inhibited in the periphery. Because the H-reflex is known to
be monosynaptic, this indicates that this inhibition occurs at the
level of the spinal cord.
Human electrophysiology experiments have also found a
shared basis for action execution and observation. Humans
show suppression of sensorimotor cortical EEG rhythms dur-
ing both action observation and execution, measurable with
either EEG or MEG (Pineda, 2005; Hari, 2006). This occurs
during observation of facial expressions as well as both transi-
tive and intransitive limb movements and is distributed soma-
totopically over sensorimotor cortex according to the body
part being observed (Muthukumaraswamy and Johnson, 2004;
Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2004, 2006; Oberman et al., 2005;
Moore et al., 2011). The effect is stronger for reach-to-grasp
actions that are directed toward an object than those that are not
(Muthukumaraswamy and Johnson, 2004; Muthukumaraswamy
et al., 2004).
These types of TMS, EEG, and MEG experiments have not
been performed in macaques, but single-cell recordings show that
mirror neurons in ventral premotor area F5 and inferior pari-
etal areas PF/PFG respond to both the execution and observation
of similar movements, including both manual actions and oro-
facial movements (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996;
Ferrari et al., 2003). However, macaque mirror neurons only
respond to observed manual actions which are object- or goal-
directed; they do not respond to observed mimed (intransitive)
actions (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Ferrari et al.,
2003). The human homologues of macaque F5 and PF/PFG are
Brodman areas 44 and 40 (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). In
neuroimaging experiments, these regions are active during obser-
vation and execution of similar actions in a somatotopic manner
(Buccino et al., 2001). Motor contagion in humans has been pro-
posed to rely on a mirror system homologous to that in macaques
(Blakemore and Frith, 2005). If this is true, then motor contagion
and motor interference should occur in macaques (as well as
any other species that have a mirror system), although to our
knowledge this has not been tested.
In addition to the reflexive phenomena described above,
individuals can also copy each other’s behavior in a less automatic,
more controlled manner. Many species are capable of using
observational learning to copy another’s goal-directed action.
Rats can learn to run a maze by observing another rat (Zentall
and Levine, 1972). Some birds socially learn each other’s songs
(Zentall, 2004). Guppy fish can socially learn foraging innova-
tions (Laland and Reader, 1999). Wild macaques learn to wash
sand off sweet potatoes by watching other macaques (Kawamura,
1959). Both capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees learn to use
tools by watching conspecifics (Fragaszy and Visalberghi, 1989;
Inoue-Nakamura and Matsuzawa, 1997).
Undoubtedly, not all of these phenomena need to be under-
stood as involving reflective processing. When considering the
impressive variety of social learning across species, it is important
to recognize that the same general function—copying another’s
behavior—can result from different psychological and neuro-
physiological mechanisms in different species. Various schemas
exist for categorizing different types of social learning behav-
ior [e.g., (Whiten et al., 2004; Zentall, 2006)]. In general, the
types of social learning behavior that are most widespread across
species do not involve a representational understanding of the
goal behind an observed action; for example, observers’ attention
may be drawn to particular objects or locations in the environ-
ment, facilitating their own independent discovery of how to
produce an action involving that object (stimulus enhancement);
they may learn about the positive or negative value of an object
or event (valence learning); or they may reflexively copy aspects
an observed action’s movements without reflective understand-
ing of its goal (mimicry). Many of these behavioral phenomena
may occur reflexively, without representational understanding of
the observed action’s goal.
Forms of controlled social learning that involve an under-
standing of the observed goal are more rare, but are well-studied
in primates. Most primate social learning is classed as emulation
(copying an action’s goal or result but not specific movements
or methods) rather than imitation (copying both the goal and
methods) (Whiten et al., 2009). While some studies report imita-
tion in other species [e.g., chimpanzees: (Hayes and Hayes, 1952;
Custance et al., 1995; Horner and Whiten, 2005); marmosets:
(Voelkl and Huber, 2000)], none of these species use it so pro-
fusely and complexly as humans. In particular, a decades-long
body of behavioral research describes a bias toward emulation
in chimpanzees, and a bias toward imitation in humans (Whiten
et al., 2009). For example, in one task (Horner andWhiten, 2005),
the experimenter demonstrates a complex series of actions that
open a puzzle box (pulling levers, pressing buttons, etc.). When
the puzzle box is opaque and the relationship between these
maneuverings and the opening of the box is not perceptible, both
chimpanzees and human children copy these actions with high
fidelity. However, if a transparent box is used, it becomes obvi-
ous that some of the demonstrator’s actions do not contribute to
opening the box. Chimpanzees dispense with these useless actions
and use the most efficient method to open the box. Human
children, on the other hand, persist with these actions, even when
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instructed not to reproduce any “useless” or “silly” actions, and
even when they verbally report that they understand that they are
useless (Lyons et al., 2007). This is termed “overimitation,” and it
is even stronger in adults than in children (McGuigan et al., 2011).
Developmentally, copying of goal directed actions emerges
in humans improves over the first two years of life, and in
chimpanzees during the first four years (Inoue-Nakamura and
Matsuzawa, 1997; Elsner, 2007; Elsner et al., 2007). Human
infants are more likely to reproduce actions that have goals than
those that do not (Elsner, 2007), and when preschool children
copy a goal-directed movement, they tend to use movements that
are less congruent with the demonstrator’s than if there is no goal
(Bekkering et al., 2000). It is interesting to note that motor inter-
ference effects are not observable until the age of four to five
years (Marshall et al., 2010; Saby et al., 2011), suggesting that
motor resonance, which would otherwise cause interference, may
be somehow damped during the time that goal-directed copy-
ing is developing. However, children show electrophysiological
correlates of motor resonance (mu suppression) as early as 6
months and seem to do so throughout development (Lepage and
Theoret, 2006; Nystrom, 2008; van Elk et al., 2008). An impor-
tant area of future research will be the developmental relationship
of reflexive motor resonance phenomena with more controlled
social learning phenomena.
To date, the neural correlates of goal-directed behavioral copy-
ing have only been studied in humans. In humans, two recent
meta-analyses of functional neuroimaging studies on imitation
found that it involves the homologues of the macaque mir-
ror regions (Brodman areas 44 and 40), as well as broader
regions of superior parietal lobe, inferior parietal lobe, dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex, and premotor cortex (Caspers et al.,
2010; Molenberghs et al., 2011). Lesions to either frontal or
parietal regions can cause apraxia, a neuropsychological disor-
der of imitation (Goldenberg, 2009). While the macaque mirror
system is activated by the observation of goal-directed actions,
notably, monkeys do not imitate according to the definition above
(copying both goal and method; Fragaszy and Visalberghi, 2004).
However, macaques do recognize when their goal-directed actions
are being imitated by a human experimenter (Paukner et al.,
2005). Even accepting a looser definition of imitation, it is obvi-
ous that macaques’ social learning is less profuse and less complex
than humans’. Furthermore, the macaque mirror system does not
respond to meaningless actions not directed at an object, e.g.,
mimed grasping, while the human mirror system does (Rizzolatti
and Craighero, 2004). This suggests that species differences in
the mirror system could be related to species differences in social
learning.
One recent study examined the white matter connectivity of
the mirror system in macaques, chimps, and humans (Hecht
et al., 2012). In macaques and chimps, the bulk of the white
matter within the mirror system connects temporal perceptual
areas directly to the frontal mirror region and surrounding frontal
areas. Since the frontal mirror region is thought to contain a
“vocabulary of motor acts” where actions are coded according to
their goals or results (Rizzolatti et al., 1988; Bonini et al., 2009),
this pathway might underlie macaques’ and chimps’ bias toward
copying an action’s results over its movements. In humans,
relatively more white matter in the mirror system passes through
parietal cortex. Since the parietal mirror region is thought to per-
form sensorimotor mapping of the spatial and temporal details
of observed and executed movements (Rozzi et al., 2008; Bonini
et al., 2009), this increased connectivity might allow humans
to map observed actions onto their own motor systems with
greater kinematic detail, and could be related to our propensity
for “overimitation.”
Taken together, research on phylogeny, development, and neu-
ral activation suggests that self-other mapping in the somatomo-
tor domain can occur via both reflexive and reflective processes.
A reflexive mechanism is in place very early whereby observed
movements are automatically reproduced. After a short period—
days, weeks, or months depending on the species (with unknown
implications of this difference)—an inhibitory process comes
online and this automatic mimicry disappears. In human adults,
this inhibition seems to be mediated by the spinal cord, perhaps
leaving the brain free to mirror observed action uninhibitedly
(Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). This direct, low level self-other
matching mechanism is thought to result from simple Hebbian
synaptic potentiation during development: an individual’s own
action causes motor and visual neurons to “fire together,” increas-
ing the chances that they will eventually “wire together,” so that
after repeated co-activation, activation in one neuron alone can
cause activation in the other, creating neurons that activate in
response to observed, unexecuted action (Keysers and Perrett,
2004; Brass and Heyes, 2005). Such a mechanism should be
widespread across phylogeny, might account for the development
of premotor/parietal mirror neurons as well as other, heteroge-
neous cell types, and might account for motor contagion and
mimicry across various species.
On the other hand, a reflective mechanism allowing the repro-
duction of goal-directed actions emerges later in development
and is more limited across phylogeny. In humans, it involves
some of the same neural substrates as reflexive motor resonance,
as well as other regions more commonly associated with reflec-
tive processing, like dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and superior
parietal cortex (Caspers et al., 2010; Molenberghs et al., 2011;
Koenigs et al., 2009; Barbey et al., 2012a,b). A sub-distinction
can be made between copying actions’ results versus movements;
humans focus on copying movements, while chimpanzees and
other primates focus on copying goals. This difference in behavior
may be the result of an underlying difference in neural respon-
sivity (whether the mirror system can respond to intransitive
action), which itself may be a result of a difference in white mat-
ter connectivity (the amount of connectivity with parietal cortex)
(Hecht et al., 2012). The idea that copying results and copying
movements are semi-dissociable processes is supported by clinical
evidence. Goldenberg (2009) argues that lesions to frontal cortex
in humans impair imitation of goal-directed actions, while lesions
to parietal cortex impair imitation of non-goal-directed, mean-
ingless actions. Furthermore, non-goal-directed imitation may be
specifically impaired in autism (Gowen et al., 2008). (Paulus et al.,
2011) suggest that developmentally, motor resonance is necessary
but not sufficient for social learning of goal directed actions. This
holds across phylogeny: reflexive motor resonance and mimicry
are seen across a wide variety of species, and seem to be necessary
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but not sufficient for the development of social learning involving
a reflective understanding of observed goals, which is more rare
across phylogeny.
SELF-OTHER MATCHING IN THE PERCEPTUAL DOMAIN: EYE
MOVEMENTS AND COGNITION ABOUT PERCEPTION
Individuals can match their own visual perception or attention to
that of another by following gaze direction (Emery et al., 1997).
It is easy to see how gaze following is a broadly adaptive trait—if
something has drawn my conspecific’s attention, it likely deserves
my attention as well, since we share food sources, predators, prey,
and potential mating partners. Bringing one’s own perception
into congruence with another individual’s can also serve as first
step toward bringing behavior into congruence. Therefore, it is
not surprising that this basic behavior occurs automatically across
the animal kingdom, in various species of reptiles, birds, and
mammals.
In its simplest form, gaze following is tested by having the
subject view a conspecific or human experimenter looking up,
down, or to the side, andmeasuring whether the subject performs
a congruent adjustment in visual attention. This test is passed
by tortoises, a variety of birds, domestic goats, dogs and wolves,
and a variety of primates (Bugnyar et al., 2004; Schloegl et al.,
2008; Loretto et al., 2009; Rosati and Hare, 2009; Wilkinson et al.,
2010; Kehmeier et al., 2011; Range and Viranyi, 2011; Teglas et al.,
2012). Some species, such as macaques (Emery et al., 1997), only
follow shifts in head or whole body orientation, while others,
such as chimpanzees (Tomasello et al., 2007), can follow shifts in
eye gaze alone. Humans’ white sclera make our eye movements
more apparent than other species’, who have darker sclera; this is
thought to be a contributing factor in our ability to follow eye
movements (Tomasello et al., 2007; Rosati and Hare, 2009).
In a more complex version of this task, the demonstrator
individual looks toward an object that is occluded from the sub-
ject’s view by a barrier. Animals that can pass this task are said
to follow gaze “geometrically” and are inferred to have some
referential understanding of the content of the demonstrator’s
perception—i.e., that the demonstrator is “looking at” a partic-
ular thing. Animals that fail this task are taken to lack the ability
to take the visual perspective of others (Rosati and Hare, 2009).
Species currently known to follow gaze geometrically include a
subset of those above: spider monkeys and capuchins (Amici
et al., 2009), chimpanzees, bonobos, and gorillas (Okamoto-
Barth et al., 2007), dogs (Teglas et al., 2012), wolves (Range and
Viranyi, 2011), rooks (Schloegl et al., 2008), and ravens (Bugnyar
et al., 2004).
In a yet more complex task, perspective-taking is studied in
humans and great apes using tasks that test the subject’s ability to
know that another individual does not know something that the
subject does. For example, in the Sally-Anne test (Baron-Cohen
et al., 1985), Sally places a toy in her basket and then leaves the
room. Anne then enters the room and moves the toy. The subject
is asked where Sally will look for her toy when she returns. This
measures whether the subject has “theory of mind,” or the abil-
ity to attribute mental states or perspectives to others which are
separate from one’s own (Premack and Woodruff, 1978). Thus
it is an explicit measure of a reflective process. However, there is
evidence that implicit processing is also involved in this task. Both
human adults and children are less accurate at judgments about
their own visual perspective when there is another person present
with a different physical perspective, suggesting that we reflexively
map what others can see and that this uses the same cognitive
machinery as awareness of what we can see (Samson et al., 2010;
Surtees and Apperly, 2012). Human infants look longer at the
correct answer in a Sally-Anne test before they can produce a cor-
rect explicit verbal response, suggesting that they have implicit
awareness of others’ perceptual knowledge (Clements and Perner,
1994). Various experiments suggest that chimpanzees are able to
take the perspective of others (Povinelli et al., 1990; Hare et al.,
2001; Brauer et al., 2007; Krachun and Call, 2009; Krachun et al.,
2009). For example, in one study (Hare et al., 2001), subordinate
chimpanzees preferred to approach food behind a barrier, so that
a dominant chimpanzee could not see.
The complexity of gaze following behavior changes across
development, and this differs between species. In humans, gaze
following emerges between 3–18 months (Scaife and Bruner,
1975; Carpenter et al., 1998; Corkum andMoore, 1998). In rhesus
macaques, it begins to emerge around 5.5 months; in chim-
panzees, between 3–4 years (Rosati and Hare, 2009). At first,
infants follow head movements but not eye movements alone,
and continue to follow a demonstrator’s repeated gazes toward an
information-less target (such as a blank ceiling). This suggests a
lack of understanding that eyes are the mechanism of perception,
and that gaze following behavior is relatively inflexible, auto-
matic, and not affected by learning. Later, infants begin to follow
eye movements alone, and later still they can inhibit repeated
gaze-follows to a meaningless target. The ability to follow gaze
geometrically emerges around this time. This pattern of develop-
ment is similar in wolves, macaques, chimpanzees, and humans
(Scaife and Bruner, 1975; Carpenter et al., 1998; Corkum and
Moore, 1998; Ferrari et al., 2000; Rosati and Hare, 2009; Range
and Viranyi, 2011).
The neural basis of gaze following has been studied in
humans and macaques. In humans, neuroimaging experiments
have implicated the superior temporal sulcus, cuneus, inferior
parietal lobule, and intraparietal sulcus in perceiving others’ look-
ing direction (Puce et al., 1998; Wicker et al., 1998; Hoffman
and Haxby, 2000; Pelphrey et al., 2003, 2004; Materna et al.,
2008). Superior temporal sulcus is involved in encoding inten-
tions related to gaze (Pelphrey et al., 2003), while intraparietal
sulcus may be related to shifts in one’s own visual attention
regardless of social context (Materna et al., 2008). In macaques,
cells in superior temporal sulcus respond to different angles of
head orientation (Perrett et al., 1991). Cells in area LIP of the
intraparietal sulcus fire both when the monkey looks in the cell’s
preferred direction and when another monkey looks in the same
direction (Shepherd et al., 2009). A second population of cells
in this area was suppressed by the observation of other mon-
keys’ gaze. Interestingly, most of F5 mirror neurons are tuned to
a particular visual perspective for observed grasping movements,
suggesting a role for perspective in the somatomotor self-other
matching system (Caggiano et al., 2011).
Considering the neural and behavioral research together across
phylogeny, some patterns emerge. There are no species that
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are capable of following eye movements alone but not head
movements, or head movements but not whole body movements.
Developmentally, across species, the ability to follow eye move-
ments alone emerges after the ability to follow head or body
movements. Additionally, there are no species that follow gaze
behind a barrier but not into empty space, and following gaze
into empty space always emerges in development before follow-
ing gaze around a barrier. The ability to follow gaze geometrically
co-emerges with the ability to not follow repeated gazes toward
an informationless target, such as a blank ceiling. Thus it appears
that there are two fairly discrete components to gaze follow-
ing: an early-developing, egocentric, automatic one, and a later-
developing, allocentric, controlled one that takes into account the
referential information in the gaze.
It seems likely that these components might rely on at least par-
tially separable neural substrates. Shepherd et al. (2009) suggest
that LIP cells are involved in the reflexive mode of gaze following.
Similarly, Pelphrey et al. (2003) suggest that human intraparietal
sulcus is concerned with egocentric mapping of spatial attention.
This suggests the hypothesis that the automatic, implicit mode
of gaze following can be mapped to parietal cortex. We won-
der whether Shepherd et al. (2009) second population of cells
that were suppressed by observed gaze changes might serve to
override this automatic “mirroring” of attention, and whether
the onset of their inhibition during development might coin-
cide with the onset of the ability to habituate to meaningless
gazes. Conversely, Pelphrey et al. (2003) suggest that in humans,
the superior temporal sulcus may be more involved with judg-
ing the intentionality of others’ actions, and has been implicated
more broadly in reflective social cognitive processes like theory of
mind. Thus we can hypothesize that this region might underlie
the referential understanding of the content of others’ gaze.
SELF-OTHER MATCHING IN THE AUTONOMIC/EMOTIONAL DOMAIN
In addition to the somatomotor and oculomotor domains, self-
other matching also occurs in the autonomic domain. This can
extend to very low-level functions, such as pupil size (Harrison
et al., 2006, 2007, 2009) and respiration (Jeannerod and Frak,
1999; Paccalin and Jeannerod, 2000; Mulder et al., 2005; Kuroda
et al., 2011). “Contagion” of autonomic states has been well stud-
ied across species in the domain of pain, fear, and anxiety. For
example, geese have heart rate increases after viewing their mate
in conflict (Wascher et al., 2010). Mice have stronger responses to
pain after viewing another mouse in pain (Langford et al., 2006;
Jeon et al., 2010; Jeon and Shin, 2011). Monkeys exhibit behav-
ioral signs of fear when watching another monkey in fear, even
when the observer cannot see the item that is feared (Mineka
and Cook, 1993). Crying is contagious in human infants (Geangu
et al., 2010). In adult humans, photographs of others in danger
or pain induces a freezing postural response (Azevedo et al., 2005;
Facchinetti et al., 2006).
Beyond simply “catching” the emotion of fear non-
referentially, various species can learn what to fear by watching
others through observational learning. For example, in an
experiment with crows, adult crows were captured, banded,
and released by human experimenters who wore distinctive
masks. The offspring of these adult crows, who observed the
masked experimenters’ actions, later produced alarm calls to
humans wearing the same masks, even though they had no
interaction with the humans personally (Cornell et al., 2011).
Similarly, monkeys can acquire fear of snakes after watching
other monkeys’ fearful interactions with snakes, without any
personal experience with snakes (Cook and Mineka, 1989, 1990).
When human adults observe others undergoing a panic attack
after a conditioned stimulus, they show greater electrodermal
responses and report more fear and anxiety for that stimulus
(Kelly and Forsyth, 2007). In humans, observational learning
of fear, like Pavlovian conditioning, subsequently produces
increased skin conductance measurements in response to a
masked (nonconsciously viewed) image, while simple verbal
instruction that an item is dangerous does not (Olsson and
Phelps, 2004). This suggests that observational learning of fear
acts via a reflexive, implicit mechanism rather than a controlled,
explicit mechanism.
Individuals of various species can also learn what not to fear
by watching others. Attenuation of fear by observational learning
has been reported in mice (Guzman et al., 2009), and extinc-
tion of avoidance behavior is facilitated by observational learning
in rats (Uno et al., 1973). Monkeys that observe other monkeys
behaving non-fearfully with snakes are less likely to acquire fear
of snakes themselves, and overshadowing can also be achieved
through observational learning in monkeys (Mineka and Cook,
1986; Cook and Mineka, 1987). Human children who see their
mothers responding positively to a fear-inducing stimulus are less
fearful of the stimulus (Gerull and Rapee, 2002; Egliston and
Rapee, 2007). For human children learning to overcome a fear
of swimming, swimming lessons are more effective when paired
with observation of a non-fearful child swimming (Weiss et al.,
1998).
Self-other matching for autonomic states seems to rely on the
same neural structures that produce those states in the observer.
In mice, observational fear learning is blocked by inactivation of
the anterior cingulate or the thalamic pain nuclei (both regions
involved in the experience of pain), but not thalamic sensory
nuclei (Jeon et al., 2010). In humans, felt and seen pain acti-
vate anterior cingulate and anterior insula (Lamm et al., 2010).
Felt and seen disgust also activate the insula (Wicker et al., 2003;
Wright et al., 2004; Jabbi et al., 2008). The amygdala seems to be
necessary for not only the experience of fear, but also the percep-
tion of fear in others—Adolph’s famous patient SM, who suffered
bilateral calcification of the amygdala, is both unable to expe-
rience fear personally and has difficulty attributing it to others
(Adolphs et al., 1994; Feinstein et al., 2010).
Another example of automatic, reflexive self-other matching
in this domain is facial expressions. As mentioned previously,
orofacial movements are automatically imitated for a brief post-
natal period in macaques, chimpanzees, and humans (Meltzoff
and Moore, 1977, 1983; Heimann et al., 1989; Myowa-Yamakoshi
et al., 2004; Ferrari et al., 2006, 2009a,b; Paukner et al., 2011),
and adult orangutans rapidlymimic facial expressions during play
(Davila Ross et al., 2008), but no other studies have assessed invol-
untary facial mimicry in adult animals. In adult humans, viewing
another individual’s facial expression causes rapid facial reactions,
or brief, reflexive, low-intensity mimicry of the expression in
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one’s own face, measureable with EMG (Dimberg and Thunberg,
1998). This occurs even when stimuli are presented to the blind
hemisphere of patients with unilateral visual cortex lesions, so
it does not require cortical awareness (Tamietto et al., 2009).
Interfering with this ability reduces emotion detection accuracy—
subjects are less accurate at naming happy facial expressions
when holding a pencil in their mouth (Oberman et al., 2007),
lesions to somatosensory cortex impair facial expression recogni-
tion (Adolphs et al., 2000), and Botox injections decrease emotion
recognition across multiple expressions (Neal and Chartrand,
2011). Furthermore, the application of a restricting gel to facial
skin, which increases feedback signals, increases emotion per-
ception accuracy (Neal and Chartrand, 2011). This suggests that
some part of this implicit, automatic mimicry is informational—
i.e., facial feedback from themimicked expression activates neural
representations about the meaning of the expression. However,
facial expressions, face-voice combinations, and body expressions
all evoke similar EMG responses in the face, suggesting that
humans also resonate with the affective meaning of expressions
and not just the motor pattern (Magnee et al., 2007).
Motor resonance and contagion for facial expressions seems
to rely on some of the same mechanisms as motor resonance
and contagion for somatomotor movements. While viewing facial
expressions, neonatal macaques showmu suppression, thought to
be an EEG index of mirror neuron activity (Ferrari et al., 2012).
Adult macaques activate frontal mirror neurons during the obser-
vation of facial expressions (Ferrari et al., 2003). Human children
(Dapretto et al., 2006) and adults (Molenberghs et al., 2011) acti-
vate inferior frontal gyrus, the homologue of macaque F5, during
the observation of facial expressions, and also show mu sup-
pression during facial expression observation (Oberman et al.,
2005; Moore et al., 2011). Interestingly, infant macaques who
imitate facial gestures have more developed reaching-grasping
behavior and fine motor control in the hand than their con-
specifics who do not, providing further evidence that this phe-
nomenon is linked to motor resonance in the somatomotor
domain (Ferrari et al., 2009b).
Yawns are a specific example of a contagious facial expres-
sion that is contagious in several species. In addition to humans,
macaques (Paukner and Anderson, 2006), gelada baboons (Palagi
et al., 2009), chimpanzees (Anderson et al., 2004; Campbell et al.,
2009; Campbell and de Waal, 2011), and dogs (Joly-Mascheroni
et al., 2008; Harr et al., 2009) also experience contagious yawning.
In humans, viewing others’ yawns activates precuneus, posterior
cingulate, and superior temporal sulcus, all regions that have been
associated with “higher-level” forms of social cognition (Platek
et al., 2005; Schurmann et al., 2005). Platek (2010) notes that
individual humans who are more susceptible to contagious yawn-
ing tend to be better at higher-order social cognitive measures
like theory of mind processing and self-face recognition, and sug-
gests that yawn contagion may be an evolutionarily old processes
that became the basis for these more complex forms of social
cognition.
In addition to self-other matching of autonomic states and
facial expressions, others’ emotions can also bematched in a more
explicit, reflective manner. Preston and de Waal (2002) use the
term “cognitive empathy” to describe a referential understanding
of another’s emotional state. Several studies show a link between
reflective and reflexive self-other matching of emotion. Subjects
who score high in emotional empathy scales have stronger facial
mimicry for observed emotions, while low-empathy subjects acti-
vate facial muscles incongruent with the observed expression—
e.g., “smiling” when seeing an angry face (Sonnby-Borgstrom,
2002). Similarly, high-empathy subjects show greater contagion
for pupil size (Harrison et al., 2007). Autism and schizophrenia,
both disorders which impair higher-order measures of empathiz-
ing, involve abnormal facial mimicry of observed facial expres-
sions (McIntosh et al., 2006; Oberman et al., 2009; Varcin et al.,
2010) and a reduction in yawn contagion (Haker and Rossler,
2009; Helt et al., 2010). A better understanding of the interac-
tion between reflexive and reflective forms of emotional self-other
matching may provide new directions for treatment in disorders
of social cognition, since some problems in higher level social
cognition and emotional response might derive from deficits in
lower-level, reflexive self-other matching systems.
Another broad area of inquiry for future research is the inter-
action between self-other matching in the emotional domain
with self-other matching in other domains. These interactions
undoubtedly exist. For example, in the motor domain, as noted
earlier, mimicry of postures, mannerisms, facial expressions,
and behaviors increases liking, smoothes social interactions,
and is more common in empathic people the chameleon effect
(Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; Paulus et al., 2011). This brings
up the interesting question of whether targeting or training self-
other matching in the somatomotor domain (or another domain)
might improve self-other matching in the emotional domain.
Given that something like the chameleon effect seems to occur in
capuchin monkeys, since monkeys prefer to interact with humans
who imitate them (Paukner et al., 2009), research on this topic in
other species might be useful for understanding it in our own.
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this review, we have aimed to provide specific examples of how
reflective processes are related to reflexive processes in self-other
matching across species in three specific domains—in the motor
domain (somatomotor movements), in the perceptual domain
(eye movements and cognition about visual perception), and in
the autonomic/emotional domain. Many unanswered questions
remain; we have highlighted a few specific questions, with some
potential ways to address them, in Table 2. Despite these unan-
swered questions, taking a broader perspective and considering
these domains together, several patterns emerge.
First, in each of these domains, there are early-developing,
automatic processes that rapidly match the observer’s state to
others’. These could emerge based on a simple Hebbian mecha-
nism, as individuals learn associations between observable effects
and internal states within the context of their own behavior. As
these associations are solidified, observation of only the pro-
cess’s effect (a fearful expression or the perception of an arm
movement) can activate representations of the internal state that
causes it (the emotion of fear or the motor representation of the
arm movement). Since Hebbian learning is a common feature of
nervous systems, seen even in mollusks, this type of self-other
matching is likely widespread across the animal kingdom.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 224 | 8
Hecht et al. An evolutionary perspective on reflective and reflexive processing
Table 2 | Some unanswered questions for future research, with some suggestions for ways to address them.
General questions To what degree does self-other matching across domains rely on a common or shared mechanism?
Is Hebbian learning during early development a general mechanism for self-other matching across domains? If so, can we
find some sort of reflexive self-other matching in any organism that has Hebbian learning and a basic ability to perceive the
behavior of conspecifics?
Are there any experience-independent (hardwired) mechanisms for self-other matching?
Motor domain The period of automatic mimicry of facial expressions last longer in humans than chimps, and longer in chimps than
macaques. Is this relevant to adult species differences in social cognition? To address this question, we will first need to
understand how neonatal mimicry impacts behavioral and neural development within these species
Does automatic mimicry of facial expressions occur in non-primate mammals, reptiles, and birds? This might be studied
with high-resolution video analysis of naturalistic social interactions
Does the “chameleon effect” play a role in naturalistic social interactions in non-human species? If so, what is the neural
mechanism? Following Paukner et al. (2011), this might be tested by experimentally manipulating whether an animal’s
behavior is copied and measuring ensuing social responses. Related neural activations might be mapped with FDG-PET
(Rilling et al., 2007; Parr et al., 2009)
Does motor resonance occur at low level, below the threshold for overt mimicry, in non-human animals? This might be
studied with motor interference tasks, mu suppression of the EEG during observed movement, or the spinal H-reflex
Mirror neurons have been found in macaques, rodents, and birds. This suggests that they likely exist in phylogenetically
intermediate species. What other animals have mirror neurons, where are they, and how do they function?
In humans, is motor resonance selectively damped during the time that children are learning to copy the goals of actions?
This could be addressed with longitudinal studies mapping the time course of neonatal mimicry, motor contagion,
goal-directed imitation, and motor interference within individual children
Do humans have unique neuroanatomy or neural responses underlying our unique capacity for imitation and overimitation?
Following Hecht et al. (2012), this can be accomplished with comparative neuroscience research
Perceptual domain What is the role of perspective-taking in self-other matching in the somatomotor domain?
How is the developmental stage of automatic gaze-following overridden? Does it coincide with the physiological
development of inhibitory mirror neurons for gaze direction (Shepherd et al., 2009)?
Are separate neural systems involved in automatic, reflexive gaze following and reflective, referential understanding of the
content of others’ visual perception?
Autonomic/emotional
domain
What emotions are “contagious” in other species? Does this differ across species? This could be tested through
naturalistic observation or laboratory-contrived situations that ensure that the observer’s reactions cannot be attributed
solely to own emotional response to the stimulus
Do adult non-human animals show rapid facial reactions for observed facial expressions, or for bodily expressions of
emotion? This could be measured with facial (or body) EMG
If so, does self-other matching for facial/bodily expressions of emotion contribute to emotion understanding in these other
species? This could be measured by training animals to do an explicit task on emotion identification (e.g., match to
sample), interfering with mimicry similar to Oberman et al. (2007), and measuring changes in accuracy
Following Platek (2010), why are human individuals who are more susceptible to contagious yawning better at measures of
higher-order social cognition? More broadly, what is the relationship between low-level emotion/autonomic contagion and
these more reflective functions?
Can we treat dysfunctions in these more reflective functions by targeting underlying, reflexive functions?
How does self-other matching in the emotional domain interact with self-other matching in other domains? Can we treat
dysfunctions in emotional self-other matching by targeting self-other matching in other domains?
Second, more complex forms of self-other matching in each
domain emerge later in development and are less prevalent across
phylogeny. They involve some of the same neural substrates as
their related lower-level processes, as well as other neural sys-
tems associated with representational thought. The function of
the lower-level processes can impact higher-level processes. For
example, paralysis of one’s own facial muscles impairs recogni-
tions of others’ facial expressions (Neal and Chartrand, 2011).
In general, these higher-level functions seem not to be present
in species that lack the underlying lower-level functions—e.g., to
date there are no species that are capable of geometric gaze fol-
lowing but not the simpler form of automatic gaze following into
empty space. Many of these higher-level functions are uniquely
developed in humans, and some may even be completely unique
to humans. However, the longer that comparative psychology
investigates which behaviors are uniquely human, the more once-
unique functions are found in other species.
Third, the proper function and development of the lower-
level systems is often critical for the proper function and later
development of the higher-level systems. Because these higher-
level functions like imitation, perspective taking, and empathy
are more immediately observable and salient, social cognitive
deficits are often attributed to dysfunctions in these higher-level
functions, but it is important to also address whether there may
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be a less obvious deficit in an underlying lower-level function. For
example, autism was once accepted as primarily a disorder of the-
ory of mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). More recent research,
though, has shown that high-functioning autistic individuals
can pass tests of theory of mind, albeit using different mecha-
nisms. Current research is increasingly pointing toward cascade
effects where early disruptions in lower-level social processes
cause derailments of later-developing, higher-level processes. For
example, early abnormalities in gaze following may underlie later
deficits in perspective taking (Elsabbagh et al., 2012); abnormali-
ties in motor resonance for body movements may lead to deficits
in imitation (Gowen et al., 2008); and abnormalities in facial
expression mimicry may be related to difficulties with empathy
(McIntosh et al., 2006; Oberman et al., 2009).
A comparative, evolutionary approach highlights the role of
these underlying, lower-level processes because it frames neural
and psychological systems in a way that emphasizes continu-
ity. As evolution produces organisms of increasing complex-
ity, new functions must be integrated into the framework of
pre-existing, simpler functions, like new heating systems being
grafted onto old ones in an apartment building. An understand-
ing of the normal or disordered function of the new systems
would be incomplete without an understanding of the underly-
ing, older systems, and of how the new are related to the old.
Thus, our understanding of the psychological and neural mecha-
nisms of self-other mapping, other forms of social cognition, and
other functions in general in our own species can be informed
by considering the layered complexity these functions in other
species.
Of course, it is obvious that there are some things about
human behavior and the human brain that are “special.” Some
human behaviors or neural features may not have easily iden-
tifiable correlates in other species (although we argue that most
probably do, to some extent). A comparative perspective can also
inform understanding of behavioral abilities that only human
have: they must rely on aspects of neural organization that are
unique to humans. Unique neural features can only be mapped
to unique behavioral features if we have a firm understanding
of which neural and behavioral features are shared with other
species.
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